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Cultural Differences
I have had the honour of working with the US Secret Service in the past, a role that involved moments of tension, good humour, a fair bit of coffee drinking, and some very intelligent conversations.
One related to the difference of approach to Protection work based on the cultural background of the host country. For a Presidential Visit, the USSS work with the local security teams to agree how the President will be protected – this is a balance between the expectations of the USSS and the local knowledge of the hosts. For example what is ideal in the US may be problematic for the host country and a better alternative suggested.
Most of this is a pragmatic conversation between experts, however culturally there may be fundamental differences that lead to certain responses.
- In some countries, if a VIP is attacked they will be moved away from the threat.
- In other countries, if the VIP is attacked they will defended at the scene.
Culturally, running away may not be seen as acceptable and to expect it may therefore meet with resistance. The planned response may not be followed.
The existence of these cultural differences also applies within companies, especially multinationals or companies formed by mergers, where different teams have different cultures that may in the event of an emergency clash with the preplanned corporate responses. In the worst cases, you can find that not only are reacting to an attacker but also your own side.
Running exercises to identify the issues is important, as is clearly defining expectations and roles in handling an incident.
Three Common Technical Failings
A regular part of my work is to undertake technical audits of IT systems, and report on my findings.
This is different to a Penetration Test in that an audit confirms the general health of a system rather than attempting to break into it. It is similar to the difference between the local Crime Prevention Officer having a look at your house and giving advice to help you remove weaknesses, and a burglar casing the joint. There are three things that are seen in almost every audit: I could almost write part of the report in advance.
Patching is not maintained.
Implementing the vendor’s patches remains the best way of reducing the number of security issues within a system. This should be done regularly and against a defined policy.
The policy is important, as it defines the maximum window of opportunity that an organisation is willing to tolerate for their systems to be vulnerable. For systems where the protection of the information is critical, a policy of patch production immediately may be appropriate, and the risk of disruption is acceptable. This is often known as “Patch and be Damned”.
For less critical systems, then you can test the patches before a large monthly patch deployment.
Antivirus is not up to date.
Antivirus systems, despite their limitations, remain the last line of defence against malware. They are at their most effective when they are able to deal with new attacks, and to do this they must have the latest signature files and the latest versions of the detection engine.
As with the patching of software, antivirus software (properly called malware detection software) should be kept up to date in accordance with policy.
Antivirus is not fool proof, and should not be the only form of defence, but if you’ve got it, then make sure it is effective.
It is reasonable to have one policy document that covers patching and antivirus.
Firewalls are open.
The purpose of a firewall is to limit the connections that can be made through it. Restricting which devices can talk directly to others, and which protocols or ports they can use will hamper the spread of any attack. It must only allow connections that are required for the solution to work and no more. Any additional rules, however convenient they may be, reduces its effectiveness.
And if I see a bunch of rules followed with “default = allow all” I will comment on it.
Take note and consider this a free bit of advice. Following it makes you safer (and adds variety to my work).
The President’s Phone
It appears that President Trump remains committed to his elderly Android phone. This has caused a flurry of speculation on the risks of doing so. There was a similar debate about President Obama retaining his Blackberry when he took office.
This was a subject I discussed with the US Secret Service during one Obama’s State Visits; and sensibly there are limits on what can be said publicly, so I will avoid going into specifics.
So, what are the Risks here?
- Access to sensitive information on an unencrypted device? Physical access to the device allowing access to data at rest, or account credentials – usernames and passwords. Unlikely, the device is in the jacket pocket of the US President – there are adequate physical controls. This was viewed as adequately managed.
- Remote access to data? This is a more significant risk. If it is a stock devices, running an old version of Android there are unpatched vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to obtain information from the device. At Rest storage encryption doesn’t help here. This remains a risk, and is a good reason for retiring the device. Especially given that obtaining credentials for e-mail and Twitter accounts could be a extremely usedful for an attacker. It is quite possible that this would both as a result of a targeted attack on President Trump or an untargeted attack that just sweeps up all credentials from any device they can find.
- Evesdropping? Again these are attacks against vulnerable, unpatched, devices, and they are available to foreign intelligence services. These attacks enable the device to become a sophisticated bug in any room. Such an attack would be of great interest to foreign governments in giving access to sensitive and non-public discussions. This is going to be a highly targeted attack by highly capable attackers and a significant security threat.
- Location tracking. A mobile phone of any nature has to talk to a network to operate, and that, as well as any compromise of a smartphone to get it to report location. This can be used to understand where it is at any time, and any pattern of movement. It is extremely valuable information that can support both a direct attack on an individual, and to obtain information on who they meet and regular patterns of behaviour. Location can leak by many paths, data in images, social media posts, and is frequently overlooked. This location tracking threat is a critical concern to the physical protection of a VIP.
So, if your Risk Assessment indicates risks that you are unable to accept as part of your business, what controls can be used?
Require a device with patched software and applications that are still under support. Your employee may like their old Galaxy S3, but is their using is a risk to your business? It is at this point that BYOD meets security and should be addressed in the mobile working policy (“BYOD, but not any device”) – unless you are confident in securing and supporting every mobile phone made in the last fifteen years.
The use of an always on VPN, bringing all data traffic back to a point where it can be monitored for abnormal or unusual behaviour. Not all data can be monitored, unless you wish to compromise TLS connections, and users may (quite rightly) object to that on devices they also conduct personal business on. Monitoring, and acting on, unusual connections and activities is normally sufficient.
Periodic audit of the device to identify any unusual or unauthorised software or apps. Either using software continually running on the device, or by periodically inspecting the device with tools.
Controls over where devices are not allowed. If there are particularly sensitive areas in a business, or sensitive conversations, then ban devices. Provide small lockers to allow users to store them outside of the area.
Advice, guidance and training for users. And record when it has been delivered.
Remote disabling or wiping of the device.
Remote application execution: VDI for mobiles, or deliver all information through TLS browser sessions without requiring apps and data storage on the device.
The only control normally beyond the reach of a business is to use a private, closed, network with technologies to prevent RF or network based user tracking. But you would only use that in the most critical of cases…
Fake News
“Fake News”, misinformation, has been in the News recently.
2016 was the year when deliberately misleading “news” stories, used to manipulate public opinion and to directly influence events, really came to the fore. So, what has this to do with businesses, and why, as an Information Security Specialist am I interested in it?
It can be a significant threat to a business – either directly, where fake news has been made to damage a company or influence it’s share price, or as a result of a different attack.
This relates to the circulation of “incorrect information” that is a threat to the business – analogous to the use of incorrect information within the business. The key difference is that the incorrect information is not held and managed by the business.
So, how do you mitigate the risk?
- Be able to respond quickly to fake news:
Have a Response Plan, know in advance who will be involved in the response, and how you will co-ordinate and manage this. - A credible and engaging reply to the story.
This will depend on the nature of the threat facing you. - You also want to ensure that any insurance you have covers such events to mitigate any significant financial loss or damage to the business.
A major problem in addressing such a fake news story is that responding and not responding may both cause an escalation by the attacker:
- Well, it must be true because they obviously can’t correct it or deny it. Or,
- Well, they would deny it wouldn’t they.
This means that you will need to have expertise available to support you in minimising the damage.
There is a reason to protect information
This article in the Guardian caught my eye.
Two months after a visit by Chinese officials, a company in Scotland with an innovative Wave Power design was burgled. Several Laptops were stolen. The burglars went straight to the company offices on the second floor of the building, bypassing companies on the lower floors.
A couple of years later, a Chinese company with close ties to the Chinese government, started making very similar Wave Power devices.
The Scottish company is now out of business.
So, assuming that there was nefarious activity here – and that is not proven, just a series of odd coincidences – what can we learn?
Information Security is not just about protecting personal or financial information. It is also important for commercial reasons: the designs, software and business model that a company has is the heart of what the company is actually worth.
There is a cost for the loss of that information. It is not unreasonable to spend an appropriate amount of money securing that information. How much depends on the capability of any threat, and on the risk appetite of the company.
Could the information have been realistically protected against the theft of it on a laptop? Probably, thought we do not know what precautions this company had in place. Realistically, a good hard drive encryption system, tied to the TPM that is in modern Laptops, would have defeated most attackers. Good physical security, alarms, and CCTV. Lock the laptops away when the office is unoccupied. General good security hygiene.
Commercial espionage does happen.
Evolution of Cyber Attacks
There is a common view that malware is something that allows an attacker access to your computer so he can steal your data. Remote Access Trojans delivered the contaminated attachment for example, are a typical example.
The attacker then profits by selling your data to others who exploit it. However, this involves trusting a larger number of people and increases the risks to the attacker of being caught. It also involves a lot of additional work, blending details from many attacks to hide where the data was taken from, and who took it.
Ultimately, criminal activity is driven by a desire to make money. And to survive to be able to enjoy your gains.
There has been a well publicised rise in ransomware where the malware encrypts files or disables a system and money is required by the attacker to release them. This is a result of the attackers wishing to remove the risk from the monetisation of their successful compromise of a system. They are reducing the number of people needed to realise the profit, and exploiting the anonymity of Bitcoin to remain hidden
The consequences of the two types of Malware on a businesses that are unprepared for them are different. The former is an attack against confidentiality, ransomware attacks availability.
Both are Security Incidents, and both are in part mitigated by anti-malware systems, but the method of surviving the attack is different.
Confidentiality losses can be reduced by the appropriate use of encryption, ensuring that if data is compromised there is another layer of defence in place.
Availability losses can be mitigated by a suitable business continuity plan to ensure business can still operate in the absence of whatever technology is being held to ransom. It just has to last long enough for affected items to be repaired or replaced, and data recovered from backups. And keep the backups off-line, finding they have also been encrypted will not improve matters.
The likelihood of both can also be reduced by user education: Be aware of Phishing Attacks, report odd events. The impact is reduced by Incident Response planning.
At the moment, ransomware is commonly attacking traditional IT systems and more recently mobile phones and other devices. In the future ransomware will be deployed against smart connected things.
Pay One Bitcoin to get your Roomba back out from under the sofa.
